Open Letter to Minister of Interior Affairs Yuri Lutsenko

by Evgen Zakharov, Olena Shostko

Dear Minister Lutsenko,

As we learned from a TV Simon newscast on April 15, 2005, Mykhailo Prytula, whom you appointed Chief of Organized Crime Control Division in Kharkiv Oblast, was dismissed from his office. It is the pace at which it all happened that cannot but invite our enquiries.

On April 13, 2005, in a statement before the members of the Parliament's Organized Crime and Corruption Control Committee holding its ad hoc session in Khrakiv, Mr. Prytula linked Mr. I Chekotylo, recently posted as Chief of Criminal Police to the Oblast Administration of the Interior Ministry, to an attempt of releasing from custody the suspects in a gas distillate fraud.

Statements like that one would have been unheard of in the Kuchma-ruled Ukraine, indeed; they may and ought to be made in the new Ukraine, and at conferences of this nature in particular. An officer not bound by the fetters of the local law enforcement 'system of reference', Mykhailo Prytula, the one who invited assistance of the public, must have taken your appeals for cleansing the police and for their ethics at their face value. The level of the conference and Mr. Prytula's track record alike give no reason to believe that an official of his caliper would choose to misinform other attendees or use the opportunity just to take revenge - all the more so that he is new to Kharkiv.

In the past five years, Organized Crime Division of Kharkiv had been 'sick and very dangerous' to the public at large, testimony to which were the words of Mr. Volodymyr Stretovych, Chairman of the Committee ('In recent years Kharkiv was leading in the number of complaints to the Committee on actions of this special unit'), those of Governor Arsen Avakov (during the campaign his communications were wiretapped and his person under surveillance by Division's officers)and many business people.

There are other grounds to believe that the Division performed otherwise very poorly. Admittedly, over the past five years the number of offences related to illegal drug trafficking was on the rise, and it is in this criminal field that organized crime groups tend to crop up earlier than elsewhere. Narcotics are a very lucrative criminal business. In Kharkiv, therefore, with its estimated 20,000 regular drug users, members of the special squad would appear to be pretty busy. However, in 1999-2002 only 9 (!) cases were committed to court, bringing charges of organized drug crime. Regrettably, we have no knowledge so far as to the number of eventual convictions; in practice, though, at the final stage of proceedings it tends to reduce by half.

A source in the Supreme Court of Ukraine reports that, in 2002, Kharkiv set the Ukrainian record in interception warrants - 4000 of these were issued (the measure may only be allowed where serious and grave crimes are investigated). That year 51 organized crime cases were solved, and the number remained virtually the same in the subsequent two years. Whose communications were then wiretapped by Organized Crime, on what grounds, and what was the effectiveness of those measures?

We believe that a senior officer of the Organized Crime Division (Mr. I Chekotylo was a deputy to the Chief of the unit concerned) should not get a promotion while the matter has not been completely cleared up. This is, however, what has happened in the case. We would then seek to understand the reasons for his preferment. Following Mr. Prytula's allegations a fact-finding commission was set up under the Oblast Department. Whay have you not waited until it delivered its conclusions? The situation in Kharkiv Oblast warrants your immediate and close attention.

The experience that the Kharkiv Human Rights Group has gained protecting citizens' rights in pretrial investigation gives us grounds to believe that the Organized Crime Control Division was a unit where detainees were subject to unlawful treatment. Governor Avakov himself called it a 'political persecution' authority.

As far as Mr. I Chekotylo goes, there are media reports of his involvement in serious violations in 1999-2004. Although the facts reported in the press and on the Internet may not be considered a perfect proof of guilt, the mere fact that they were published over several years, and what is more, the ill-famed years when journalists knew better than criticize senior police officials, points to serious issues and calls for investigation.

As we observe personnel certification and appointments to the senior positions in Kharkiv police system we have to make a rueful conclusion that it goes not the way you declared. Our petitions concerning specific cases or individuals were set aside and appear to have gone unnoticed by you.

We want to point out that such hasty decision concerning M. Prytula negates the initiatives proclaimed by the President Yushchenko about real fight against corruption and organized crime, and will serve as a signal for the staff of your ministry “not to wash dirty linen in public” and “to uphold the dignity of the office”.

Evgen Zakharov, co-chairman of the Kharkiv Human Rights Group
Olena Shostko, PhD, member of the Kharkiv Human Rights Group

( categories: Letters )

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Submitted by Terry Hallman on Mon, 2005-04-18 03:29.

First of all, to Pani, I look forward to the remainder of this translation.


At the same time, you (Pani) and other Maidan and Pora "insiders" are aware of my efforts regarding community/economic development and anti-corruption starting in Kharkiv and descended from (my) previous efforts in Crimea and before that in Russia (Tomsk.) Much of those those efforts relate to microentrprise -- assisting poor people without access to financial markets otherwise to obtain loans to start their own businesses and take control of their own lives. The Internet business that you and other activist insiders know about, is aimed at creating revenues especially to provide start-up funding for microenterprises (defined as ten employees or less) first in Kharkiv.


Along those lines, I would like to note that prior microenterprise efforts in Kharkiv -- especially those supported by my (US) government -- have inadvertantly served to support excacly the sort of corruption being described so far in this thread. Upon careful examination of microenterprise support so far -- a key component in transitional community economic development efforts -- I have learned that mafia and organized crime have played heavily in Kharkiv's local small business/microenterprise scene.


For example, Barabashova bazaar, possibly the largest single shopping bazaar in Ukraine, is almost one hundred percent microenterprises. Mafia, commonly attributed to Yanukovich's clan, have routinely pressed business owners in Barabashova for so much money to pay for their "roof" (protection racket, or extortion in other words) costs that many owners were forced out of business. The ONLY microenterprise funding available in Kharkiv at present time is for existing businesses. Thus when a business is forced to close from mafia forces, the only businesses left are existing businesses -- and these are the only ones who can then qualify for microenterprise loans to increase their businesses. In effect, all microenterprise support from such organizations as USAID, Hope International, and ProCredit Bank (US and EBRD money), all goes to support mafia operations because those are mostly what have survived.


In that Mykhailo Prytula wanted assistance from 'public', he is now getting it here. Neither Kharkiv nor Ukraine can survive previous corruption, Orange Revolution notwithstanding. Yanukovich clan has surely not given up their mafia rackets in Kharkiv, and should like nothing more than continuting to crush enterprise in venues like Kharkiv's Barabashova bazaar. It will be very interesting and instructive to see how far such organizations as Organized Crime Division of Kharkiv will honestly and effectively manage such affairs; or, if they must be fired and replaced according to public will by people who will perform that job properly. For my part, I will as always wait, watch, and speak -- fully protected as a foreigner under Ukraine's Constitution, Article 27.


Razom,
Terry E. Hallman
Kharkiv

Submitted by pani on Mon, 2005-04-18 11:18.

Please distribute the letter and the corresponding news where you can.